Worktime Regulations and Spousal Labor Supply by Goux, D et al.
Worktime Regulations and Spousal Labor Supply
Goux, D; Maurin, E; Petrongolo, B
 
 
 
 
 
•	“The final publication is available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1964153”
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/handle/123456789/10970
 
 
 
Information about this research object was correct at the time of download; we occasionally
make corrections to records, please therefore check the published record when citing. For
more information contact scholarlycommunications@qmul.ac.uk
1 
 
 
 
Worktime Regulations and Spousal Labor Supply 
 
By DOMINIQUE GOUX, ERIC MAURIN AND BARBARA PETRONGOLO* 
We study interdependencies in spousal labor supply by exploiting the design of 
the French workweek reduction, which introduced exogenous variation in one’s 
spouse’s labor supply, at constant earnings. Treated employees work on 
average two hours less per week. Husbands of treated women respond by 
reducing their labor supply by about half an hour, consistent with substantial 
leisure complementarity, and specifically cut the non-usual component of their 
workweek, leaving usual hours unchanged. Women’s response to their 
husband’s treatment is instead weak and rarely statistically significant, possibly 
due to heavier constraints in the organization of their workweek. 
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Interdependencies in spousal labor supply have long been identified as a key question in the 
study of household behavior (Ashenfelter and Heckman, 1974). Complementarities in labor 
supply and leisure within or beyond the household are also a key policy issue, as they 
represent a channel through which reforms targeted at specific segments of the population can 
ultimately affect a wider set of individuals. When the value of leisure time for an individual 
depends on the amount of leisure enjoyed by her spouse, co-workers, neighbors, social 
contacts, etc., reforms of the welfare state, or tax reforms, or changes in workweek regulations 
aimed at some segments of the workforce may impact individual behavior well beyond the 
targeted population (Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2005). 
While interdependencies in work and leisure represent an important and controversial 
issue, there is still little micro-level evidence on the actual magnitude of these effects. 
Progress in this direction has been limited by the difficulty of finding independent variation in 
the labor supply of one’s peers, as individuals within the same family or social network may 
be subject to the same reforms, or more in general to correlated labor supply shocks. Another 
major challenge is that changes in leisure time and working hours are in most cases associated 
with important changes in earnings. Thus the labor supply responses of peers cannot be 
interpreted as reflecting pure cross-hour effects, as they may also encompass income effects. 
In this paper we exploit the unique design of the workweek reduction policy implemented in 
France in the late 1990s to overcome these issues and provide one of the very first micro 
estimates of the effect of an exogenous change in individuals’ working hours on the labor 
supply of their spouses.  
In June 1998 the French socialist government mandated a reduction of the legal 
workweek, from 39 to 35 hours, to be implemented at constant monthly earnings. This made 
the legal workweek in France (by far) the shortest among OECD countries (Lee, McCann and 
Messenger, 2007, Table 2.4). In order to attenuate the impact of higher hourly wages on 
profitability, firms who would implement the shorter workweek before the relevant deadline 
would benefit from significant payroll tax cuts. Only about 300,000 firms had implemented 
the shorter workweek before the comeback of the conservative party to power in April 2002 
and the interruption of the original reform. Nevertheless, the reform implied a noticeable 
change in the workweek of at least one spouse in over one third of French households, with 
no direct impact on family income. Both within-household variation in the workweek 
reduction, and the absence of income effects, make the French worksharing reform a unique 
scenario for assessing cross-hour effects within the household. 
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In general, it is theoretically ambiguous whether a fall in working hours and thus an 
increase in non-market time of one spouse would generate a fall or a rise in working hours of 
the other spouse. Substitutability in non-market time of husbands and wives could be driven 
by substitutable spouse efforts in home production. A reduction in the workweek of one 
spouse may shift some of her time endowment from market to home production, thus freeing-
up some home production time of the other spouse, who could devote more time to market 
work. Conversely, if one detects complementarity in the non-market time of spouses, this 
would rather be consistent with complementarity of their leisure time. A reduction in the 
workweek of one spouse would increase her leisure time and thus raise the value of leisure of 
the other spouse if spouses enjoy spending time together.  
This paper uses a matched worker-firm dataset obtained by combining the French 
Labor Force Survey with firm-level information on the implementation of the shorter 
workweek, in order to estimate the labor supply response of men and women to a reduction in 
the legal workweek in their spouses’ workplaces. We detect an average reduction of about 2 
hours in the workweek of employees whose employers signed a workweek reduction 
agreement.1 When looking at spousal responses, we find that men tend to work about half an 
hour less per week when their wives become treated, while women’s response to their 
husbands’ treatment is generally weak and rarely significantly different from zero.  
Further tests reveal that men’s labor supply response to wife treatment is not 
associated with a reduction in their usual working hours, but with a reduction in the ‘non-
usual’ component of their workweek. Moreover, such response does not have a detrimental 
impact on their earnings, suggesting that men manage to cut on some form of unpaid work 
involvement, whether within a given day, or through an increase in the take-up rate of paid 
vacation and/or sick leave. If employees do not use their whole paid leave entitlement, or do 
some unpaid overtime, they have some leeway in cutting their hours while avoiding earnings 
losses, and it is mostly by adjusting around these unpaid work margins that men respond to 
shorter workweek agreements in their wives’ firms. Under the assumption that the workweek 
reduction in wives’ firms affects their husbands only via wives’ labor supply, we provide an 
instrumental variable estimate of the average cross-hour effect for husbands of 0.23, rising to 
0.34 for managers and professionals, and to 0.59 for fathers of young children.  
Our paper builds on a long strand of literature on family labor supply, investigating the 
response of an individual’s labor supply to independent changes in her spouse’s income 
                                                 
1 We will discuss below various reasons why the average effect of the shorter legal workweek on actual weekly 
hours is lower than the legal workweek reduction.   
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and/or hours of work. These changes may in turn be driven by events as diverse as retirement, 
job loss, or fiscal reforms. Several studies document the positive association between 
husbands’ and wives’ retirement decisions, over and above what would be predicted by 
correlation in age and incentives in the retirement system (Blau, 1998; Gustman and 
Steinmeier, 2000). Conversely, the added worker effect literature detects mild substitutability 
between the labor supply of spouses, as married women tend to increase their working hours 
following husbands’ job loss (Lundberg, 1985, Cullen and Gruber, 2000). More recently, 
Gelber (2012) exploits the Swedish tax reform of 1990-91 to examine own earnings’ 
responses to changes in the marginal tax rate for one’s spouse, and shows that as spousal 
earnings rise, own earnings rise too. Insofar earnings responses reflect labor supply responses, 
these findings suggest complementarity in spousal leisure. Complementarity is also detected 
by Hamermesh (2002), who finds that spouses’ daily work schedules are more synchronized 
than would occur randomly. While building on very different sources of variation, these 
papers agree in documenting important spillovers in the labor supply of spouses.  
Our contribution to this literature is threefold. First, independent variation in spousal 
hours of work at constant earnings allows us to obtain cross-hour effects that are not 
confounded by income effects. In particular, under the assumption that an employee’s 
workweek regulations affect their spouses only via their labor supply, we can identify the 
presence of leisure complementarity in the utility functions of spouses. Second, while 
previous work has mostly focused on the labor supply response of secondary earners, we find 
that it is in fact men who more strongly respond to their wives’ treatment, while the 
corresponding women’s response is much weaker. This may in turn be due to different 
degrees of leisure complementarities in the utility functions of spouses, or a to greater ability 
of men to control their working schedules. While we do not find compelling evidence on 
different preferences, the fact that women work shorter hours in the first place, and are less 
likely than men to hold managerial positions, suggests that they face relatively more binding 
constraints in the organization of their working time. Third, we provide evidence on specific 
adjustment margins in labor supply spillovers, and in particular we find that it is mostly men’s 
unusual, rather than usual, hours that are affected when their wives’ workweek is reduced.  
 In addition to the literature on household labor supply, our paper relates to another 
strand of the labor supply literature, investigating differences between micro and macro labor 
supply elasticities. Macroeconomic calibrations typically imply much larger labor supply 
elasticities than microeconometric estimates (Chetty et al. 2011a,b), and the recent literature 
has investigated two main channels potentially driving such gap. First, work on social 
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multipliers illustrates how social interactions would magnify aggregate responses relative to 
individual behavior in a range of contexts, including labor supply (Glaeser, Sacerdote and 
Scheinkman, 2003; Maurin and Moschion, 2009). Second, recent studies on optimization 
frictions have shown that costs of adjusting working hours at the intensive margin attenuate 
micro elasticities relative to aggregate responses (Chetty et al., 2011a; Chetty, 2012).  
Our work contributes to the understanding of mechanisms underlying either channel 
and the interaction between them. Specifically, labor supply spillovers are substantially 
shaped in nature and magnitude by optimization frictions, insofar the cost of adjusting 
working hours restricts spousal labor supply responses to workers who have fewer constraints 
in organizing their workweek, and to the nonusual component of their workweek. The 
resulting labor supply spillovers are thus strongly asymmetric, whereby women’s treatment 
affects male labor supply but not viceversa (with very few exceptions), and independent 
changes in usual working hours produce spillovers on nonusual hours, but not viceversa. 
Spillovers on nonusual hours may in turn have an impact on productivity and profitability, 
while the absence of spillovers on usual hours would in most cases rule out an impact on 
current earnings. As optimization frictions in working hours are likely to bind in a variety of 
institutional contexts, the French case study considered here can shed light on the nature and 
magnitude of labor supply spillovers in other scenarios. 
Finally, our paper contributes to the literature on work-sharing policies in developed 
countries.2 The study which is closest to ours is Hunt (1998), who shows that the gradual 
decline in standard working hours of male employees between 1985 and 1995 in Germany 
was not accompanied by changes in their wives’ employment rates, but by a small decline in 
their hours of work. This result, while consistent with complementarity in spousal leisure, 
may also reflect wives’ own gradual exposure to shorter standard workweeks. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. Section I gives an overview of the workweek reduction 
reform. Section II describes the data used and provides some graphic evidence. Section III 
presents our main regression results. Section IV addresses a number of caveats to a causal 
interpretation of our estimates. Section V provides instrumental variable estimates of cross-
hour effects, using mandated workweek reductions as instruments for spousal labor supply. 
Section VI concludes. 
                                                 
2 The employment effects of workweek reduction reforms in France are studied by Crépon and Kramarz, 2002, 
Askenazy, 2008, Estevao and Sa, 2008, and Chemin and Wasmer, 2009 – among others.   
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I. Historical and Institutional Context 
Since the early 1980s, the legal workweek duration in France has been 39 hours, accompanied 
by a 25% overtime wage premium and a 130 overtime hour limit per worker per year. This 
scenario was substantially changed in the late 1990s. In April 1997, the French president 
Jacques Chirac dissolved the parliament and called general elections one year ahead of the 
end of the legislature. This decision was highly unexpected and the electoral campaign that 
followed was very short. The socialist party proposed a program whose main axis was the 
reduction of unemployment through worksharing, with two basic slogans: “travailler moins 
pour travailler tous” (work less in order to work all) and “35 heures payées 39” (35 worked 
hours paid 39). The left coalition won the election in June 1997.  
The workweek reduction was implemented in two steps (see Askenazy, 2008, for a 
detailed description of the reform). The first law (Aubry I, after the then labor secretary 
Martine Aubry), passed in June 1998, set the legal workweek at 35 hours in the private sector 
and mandated its implementation by January 2000 in firms with more than 20 employees, and 
by January 2002 in smaller firms.3 Hours worked beyond the 35th hour would be treated as 
overtime hours. Firms who would implement the shorter workweek through collective 
agreements with unions before the relevant deadline would benefit from substantial cuts in 
payroll taxes,4 provided that they commited to maintain employment levels. Finally, the law 
required that workers should not experience a drop in their monthly earnings following the 
legal workweek reduction.5 In particular, firms who signed a 35-hours agreement had to grant 
a specific (4 hours) bonus to workers paid the monthly minimum wage. The general purpose 
of the law was to induce firms to raise employment levels by worksharing, while offering 
them fiscal advantages to attenuate detrimental impacts of worksharing on profitability. 
In January 2000, the second law (Aubry II) introduced a few amendments in order to 
limit the burden of the shorter workweek on employers. Specifically, with a slight redefinition 
of working time, it made it possible for employers to exclude “unproductive breaks” from the 
hours count, and thus achieve some reduction in the measure of working hours without 
changing work schedules. Also, it allowed firms to implement shorter hours on an annual – 
rather than weekly – basis, with a 1600 annual hour cap. This means that fiscal advantages 
could be obtained even with actual workweek reductions below 10%. Finally, the Aubry II 
                                                 
3 There were no explicit deadlines set for firms in the public sector.  
4 For workers paid at the minimum wage, the cuts imply a reduction of about 8% in total labor cost for 5 years. 
5 As in principle there might be an income effect through overtime pay, we will illustrate in Section III the (lack 
of) earnings effects of the shorter workweek. 
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law introduced a two-year transitional phase during which it was possible for employers to 
keep the 39-hour workweek by using overtime at a reduced 10% rate.  
Two years later, in summer 2002, the conservative party came back to power and, 
while the Aubry laws remained formally in place, the transition to the shorter workweek was 
discontinued in practice. The new government raised the maximum number of overtime hours 
from 130 to 220, and extended fiscal incentives to all firms, including those that did not sign 
workweek reduction agreements. In this new scenario firms could effectively have employees 
working 39 hours weekly, at no extra hourly cost with respect to the pre-reform scenario. 
Following these political changes, the 35-hour workweek was never fully implemented, 
especially in small private firms. Nevertheless, the Aubry laws have had a very large impact 
on the French economy, covering about 10 million workers by 2002. 
In a nutshell, the French workweek reform had several important features: it was 
largely unexpected; it has been interrupted, with only a fraction of workers being affected; it 
did not affect monthly earnings; and given its gradual implementation it would likely not treat 
spouses in a given household at the same time. We build on these features of the reform in 
order to evaluate the effect of an exogenous variation in an employee’s workweek on the 
labor supply of her spouse. 
II. Data and Descriptive Evidence 
A. The dataset 
We combine individual level information on worker characteristics and working hours with 
firm level information on collective agreements signed by employers who adopted the shorter 
workweek. Individual level information comes from the French Labor Force Survey, which is 
conducted by the French Statistical Office, INSEE. Before 2003, the LFS was conducted in 
March of every year, and covered a representative sample of about 100,000 households each 
year (with a 1/300 sampling rate). Since 2003, the survey is conducted each quarter and 
covers a representative sample of about 55,000 households each quarter. Our main analysis 
will be based on all repeated cross-sections from 1994-2009, namely all annual surveys 1994-
2002, and all first-quarter surveys for 2003-2009.  
For each household member aged 15 or above, the LFS provides information on 
gender, marital status, employment status, occupation, education, industry, monthly earnings 
and hours worked. We exploit information on both actual hours worked during the reference 
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week (typically the week before the survey), and usual hours worked in a typical week. 6  
Crucial for our purposes, our restricted use version of the LFS also provides coded employer 
identifiers.7 These allow us to match worker level information with firm level information 
from the DARES-URSSAF dataset, an administrative database collected by the French 
Ministry of Labor, which provides detailed information on all firms who signed a workweek 
reduction agreement, including the signing and implementation dates. We thus obtain a 
matched employer-employee dataset containing information on working hours of respondents 
and their spouses, as well as information on when, if ever, their employers implemented the 
shorter workweek. The matched employer-employee dataset used has some clear advantages 
compared to the non-matched LFS. First, it allows us to identify which workers were actually 
treated, and not simply the intention to treat based on the number of employees in their firms 
and the proximity to the law deadlines. Also, the information on the exact date of treatment 
makes it possible to exploit the gradual implementation of the shorter workweek, thus 
avoiding to solely rely on the announced 2000 and 2002 deadlines.  
In our analysis we select all married or cohabiting individuals aged 18-65, whose 
spouse is a wage-earner, and we focus on the labor supply response of these individuals to 
their spouses’ exposure to the shorter workweek. We define treatment as working for an 
employer who has signed a workweek reduction agreement,8 and we drop the small number of 
individuals whose spouses were treated either before 1996 or after 2002, since these early and 
late agreements may not correspond to the reform implemented in the late 1990s. Our 
working sample includes 189,894 males and 236,802 females. Descriptive statistics on these 
samples are provided in Table A1 and Figures A1 and A2 of the online appendix.  
To illustrate the timing of treatment, Figure 1 shows the gradual implementation of the 
shorter workweek on our sample. While only about 40% of employees are eventually treated, 
                                                 
6According to the official ILO (2002) definition, usual hours represent “the modal value of the number of hours 
actually worked per week over a long period of time”. This definition is applicable to workers with regular 
schedules only (about 85% of cases in the LFS), and does not include irregular or unusual overtime, nor unusual 
absences or rest. French labor laws require contracts to be explicit about hours, pay, tasks and paid leaves, and as 
a consequence interviewees would know precisely their normal hours as well as contractual changes in these. 
Moreover information in the LFS is collected through face-to-face interviews during which INSEE interviewers 
attempt to make sure that respondents understand questions and answer in a consistent way. This procedure 
considerably reduces measurement error on hours of work relative to self-filled questionnaires (Baum-Snow and 
Neal, 2009). 
7 Each employee is asked to report the name and address of her employer, and this information is coded by 
INSEE. The coded employer identifier is available for just over 80% of the employees in the LFS. Most cases of 
missing employer ID correspond to very small firms. For a detailed description of the coding procedure, see 
Abowd and Kramarz (1999) or Goux and Maurin (1999).  
8 Note that we never use hours reported in the LFS to assign treatment status, but administrative information 
collected independently by the Ministry of Labour. This prevents us from generating an artificial correlation 
between our indicator of treatment status and weekly hours. 
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there is substantial variation in treatment dates between 1998 and 2002. Table 1 reports the 
distribution of own and spousal treatment for employed respondents, and shows that about 
54% of husbands of treated women are not treated themselves by the workweek reduction 
(Panel A, column 2), while about 29% of husbands of non-treated women are treated. While 
there is some assortative mating along the treatment dimension, spouses have nonetheless 
different treatment status in a large proportion of cases. Furthermore, even when both spouses 
are treated, the timing of treatment differs for about half of the couples. Panel B shows a very 
similar picture for wives of treated and non-treated men. Information on exact agreement 
dates thus allows us to separately identify the direct and cross-effects of shorter workweeks 
across spouses, as in the majority of cases the year of treatment differs across spouses. 
B. Graphical Evidence: Direct and Cross-effect of Treatment 
Before moving on to regression analysis, we provide simple graphical evidence on the direct 
and cross-effects of the workweek reform. Figure 2 plots actual hours worked during the 
survey week by wives who are wage earners, by treatment status. The solid line refers to 
treated wives, and time zero refers to the year in which a shorter workweek agreement is 
implemented at their workplace. Their weekly hours are stable, if anything slightly rising, 
during the pre-treatment years, and drop by about 2 upon treatment. The dotted line refers to 
non-treated wives, and reports their working hours for the same dates at which treated wives 
are observed.9 Their weekly hours follow a gradually rising trend throughout the sample 
period, with no break at time zero. Thus we observe a decline of about 2 hours in working 
hours of treated wives relative to control wives at time of treatment. Interestingly, wives who 
become treated have longer weekly hours initially, and their hours converge almost exactly to 
hours of non-treated wives when their employers adopt the shorter workweek. Figure B1 
(Panel A) in the online appendix plots treatment-control differences in these series, together 
with the corresponding confidence intervals, and shows flat pre-treatment differences, 
followed by a permanent, 2-hour drop in correspondence of treatment. 
The observed drop in weekly hours for treated wives relative to the non-treated is a 
first-stage effect for the cross-hour effect on men that we intend to analyse next. A first-stage 
effect of about 2 hours is equivalent to roughly half the reduction in the legal workweek (39-
35=4), and this may be explained by a number of factors, including slight redefinitions of 
                                                 
9For each treated individual ݅, we obtain the average number of hours worked by never treated individuals 
observed in the LFS in the same year as ݅, denoted by ܪ௖ሺ௜ሻ. For each ܦ ൌ െ5,െ4,… ,൅6, the dotted line in 
Figure 2 shows the average of ܪ௖ሺ௜ሻ	over the population of treated individuals ݅ observed at a distance ܦ from 
treatment (where ܦ ൌ year of observation-year of treatment). 
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working time and/or the possibility to implement the worktime regulation at the annual rather 
than weekly level10 (see also Askenazy, 2008). This would deliver a mitigated effect of the 
workweek reduction on mean actual hours in the LFS, as the survey week falls in March of 
each year, and thus tends not to coincide with popular holiday seasons. Finally, the effect of 
the introduction of the 35-hour workweek has also been mitigated by the incidence of 
relatively short workweeks among French employees in the pre-reform period. Specifically, 
about 39% of females and 16% of males usually worked less than 39 hours per week before 
treatment11. The estimated 2-hour drop in working hours can thus be interpreted as an average 
of a higher drop for women initially working 39 hours or more, and a smaller drop for those 
initially working less than 39 hours.  
Given the behavior of treated wives, the next question is whether we observe a 
variation in either the employment rate or the number of hours worked by their husbands. 
Figure 3 shows flat and virtually identical employment patterns of husbands of treated and 
non-treated wives. Figure 4 then addresses corresponding variations at the intensive margin, 
by showing the impact on hours worked by the subsample of employed men, and reveals a 
sizeable drop in hours worked by husbands of treated women, relative to husbands of non-
treated women, at time of treatment. Specifically, the difference in working hours is close to 
zero during the five pre-treatment years, and rises to 40 minutes on average during the five 
post-treatment years. The difference between the two series shows no evidence of differential 
pre-trends, and jumps permanently upon treatment (Figure B2, Panel A). 
As the observed cross-effects might be partly induced by cases of simultaneous 
treatment of spouses, we replicate the corresponding trends on a sub-sample that excludes 
men treated at the same date as their wives, and on a subsample that excludes men ever 
treated, respectively. Reassuringly, Figures B3 and B4 in the online appendix provide a very 
similar picture of cross-hour effects as Figure 4. In the regression analysis that follows we 
pool all households and control for own and spouse treatment separately.   
Figures 5 to 7 repeat a similar analysis for female respondents and their husbands. 
Again we observe a clear first-stage effect for husbands (Figure 5), whose magnitude is very 
close to that observed for wives in Figure 2 (differences in these series are plotted in Panel B 
                                                 
10For example, an employer could cut the usual workweek to 37 hours and grant 12.5 additional days of annual 
leave. In treated firms, about 38% of male employees and 23% of female employees declare having usual 
workweeks longer than 35 hours after treatment.  
11Note that for some employees the reform was not even binding, as about 6.5% and 31% of men and women, 
respectively, had usual hours below or at 35 in the pre-treatment period. For women, short usual workweeks 
mostly correspond to part-time work. For men, they correspond mostly to specific jobs and working conditions 
(e.g. night work, evening work, Sunday work, rotating shift patterns, etc.). 
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of Figure B1). However, we find no evidence of spillover effects on their wives’ labor supply, 
either at the extensive margin (Figure 6), or the intensive margin (Figure 7). The difference 
between these series is essentially flat, and does not display any permanent jump upon 
treatment (Figure B2, Panel B). 
The descriptive evidence presented is thus suggestive of labor supply spillovers at the 
intensive margin for men, but no spillovers at either margin for women. The next sections will 
show estimates of these effects that control for observable characteristics of the individuals, 
and explore further the nature of these spillovers. 
III. Regression Results 
A. Main Estimates 
As in the previous descriptive analysis, we focus on two main outcome variables for each 
individual i in our sample, namely her employment status and her weekly hours worked, and 
assess how each is affected by the implementation of a shorter workweek agreement by her 
spouse’s employer. This would work via an effect on the spouse’s labor supply, and thus we 
start by estimating the first-stage effect of treatment on spouses. We denote by ܪ௜௧ௌ  the actual 
weekly hours worked by the spouse, and introduce a dummy variable ܣ௜௧ௌ  indicating whether 
at time ݐ she works for a firm who has ever adopted the shorter workweek. Our first-stage 
regression is the following difference-in-differences specification: 
ܪ௜௧ௌ ൌ ߙଵܣ௜௧ௌ ൅ ߙଶܣܲ݋ݏݐ௜௧ௌ ൅ ߙଷ ௜ܺ௧ௌ ൅ ܦ௧ ൅ ݑ௜௧      (1) 
where ܣܲ݋ݏݐ௜௧ௌ 	indicates the period following the introduction of the shorter workweek in the 
spouse’s firm, ܦ௧	denotes a set of year fixed effects, and ௜ܺ௧ௌ 	are relevant individual covariates, 
including a constant term. The ߙଶ coefficient shows the direct (first-stage) effect of workweek 
regulations on labor supply.  
Table 2 shows the regression results for specification (1) for wives (Panel A) and 
husbands (Panel B). All reported standard errors in this and later tables are clustered at the 
year*treatment level (32 clusters). Column 1 in Panel A shows that wives working in firms 
who implemented a workweek reduction agreement cut their labor supply by about 1.81 hours 
per week once the shorter workweek is implemented, as it was also evident from Figure 2. 
Turning to husbands, column 1 in Panel B shows again strong and significant effects of the 
workweek reduction (-1.95 hours). All these estimates are robust to the introduction of 
controls for age, education and industry effects (column 2), suggesting that the 
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implementation of the shorter workweek was largely orthogonal to these job and worker 
characteristics. Columns 3 and 4 in each panel report estimates of a similar specification for 
(the log of) monthly earnings, and once extra controls are included these show near zero 
effects of the workweek reduction on the earnings of wives and husbands. These first-stage 
results are clearly in line with the reform’s intended outcome to shorten the workweek 
without cutting monthly earnings of treated employees.  
We next assess labor supply spillovers by looking at the reduced-form effects of one’s 
spouse’s workweek reduction on own employment status and weekly hours. Note that we can 
interpret such cross-effects as stemming from the sole reduction in the amount of time spent at 
work by the spouse once we have ruled out the presence of income effects, as shown in 
columns 3 and 4 of Table 2. Our reduced-form specification for hours is 
  ܪ௜௧ ൌ ߛଵܣ௜௧ௌ ൅ ߛଶܣܲ݋ݏݐ௜௧ௌ ൅ ߛଷܣ௜௧ ൅ ߛସܣܲ݋ݏݐ௜௧ ൅ ߛହ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ܦ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧,   (2) 
where ܪ௜௧	denotes own weekly hours, ܣ௜௧	is a dummy variable denoting whether one’s 
employer has ever implemented a shorter workweek agreement, whereas ܣܲ݋ݏݐ௜௧ indicates 
the period following this agreement. The main coefficient of interest is ߛଶ. Note that this 
specification allow us to estimate cross-effects in labor supply (captured by ܣܲ݋ݏݐ௜௧ௌ ), over 
and above the direct effect of own treatment (captured by ܣܲ݋ݏݐ௜௧). These two effects can be 
separately identified insofar treatment is not simultaneous for all spouses. A similar linear 
specification to model (2) is used for the extensive margin, where the dependent variable is a 
dummy for the respondent’s employment status, and clearly ܣ௜௧ and ܣܲ݋ݏݐ௜௧ are not defined.  
The regression results are reported in Table 3. Columns 1 and 2 refer to employment, 
and columns 3-6 refer to weekly hours. Estimates show no evidence of any significant cross-
effects on employment for men, and the associated point estimate is always very close to zero, 
in line with the trends reported in Figure 3. For women, the cross-effect on employment 
becomes marginally significant when further controls are included in column 2, but its 
magnitude is negligible. As we find virtually no impact on employment, we next look at hours 
worked for those who are employed. In column 3 of Panel A we regress men’s hours on own 
treatment (ܣ௜௧ and ܣܲ݋ݏݐ௜௧), and on their wives’ treatment (ܣ௜௧ௌ  and ܣܲ݋ݏݐ௜௧ௌ ). The own 
treatment effect is about -2, and the cross-effect is -0.44 and highly significant, showing that 
when their wives become subject to the shorter workweek, men reduce their weekly labor 
supply by nearly half an hour. The magnitude of the cross-effect stays unchanged when we 
control for individual characteristics (column 4), and when we exclude men who are treated in 
the same year as their wives (column 5) or men who are ever treated (column 6). We next let 
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the effect of treatment to vary over time, and in particular we estimate a reduced-form 
specification that includes all controls as in column 4 of Table 3, having interacted ܣ௜௧ௌ  with a 
full set of pre- and post-treatment dummies. The associated estimates are reported in Figure 
B5 (Panel A) of the online appendix, and show no pre-treatment effects, together with a 
permanent drop at time of treatment. In other words, post-treatment estimates are stable and 
all quite close to the overall treatment effect of -0.44.  
Panel B of Table 3 reports corresponding estimates for women. While the own effect 
of workweek regulations is negative and significant, the cross effect is positive, small, and not 
significantly different from zero. We thus detect no evidence of spousal spillovers in the labor 
supply of women.  
We further explore cross-effects by estimating reduced-form specifications across the 
whole hours distribution. Specifically, for each ݇ between 15 and 49, we estimate reduced-
form equations for the probability of working longer than ݇ hours. These coefficients are 
reported in Figure 8, together with the corresponding 95% confidence interval. For men, cross 
effects on hours feature among the whole hours distribution, but most heavily for men 
working 35 െ 38 hours, and this result replicates very closely on a subsample that excludes 
men ever treated (graph not reported). For women, cross effects are much weaker and 
typically not statistically significant across the entire distribution, but if anything they involve 
a slight reduction in the incidence of long workweeks (40 ൑ ܪ ൑ 45).   
B. Further Estimates: Cross-effects on Usual and Non-usual Working Hours 
We next investigate the nature of labor supply spillovers in further detail by combining 
information on actual hours (ܪ) with information – also contained in the LFS – on usual 
hours (ܪ௨), defined as the number of hours worked in a typical week. Actual hours ܪ are the 
sum of the usual workweek ܪ௨ and a non-usual labor supply component ܪ െ ܪ௨, which may 
be either positive or negative, depending on whether overtime hours exceed various forms of 
“undertime” hours (e.g. unusually short working days, sickness absence, paid or unpaid 
leaves, etc.) in a given week.12 A worker may reduce weekly hours ܪ by either negotiating a 
new contract with her employer, involving lower ܪ௨, or keeping her contract unchanged, 
together with the associated ܪ௨, but cutting on ܪ െܪ௨, and namely some form of work 
                                                 
12 Note that ܪ	 and ܪ௨	 represent weekly-aggregated measures, thus someone who works one hour longer than 
the typical workday for three days in a week and one hour shorter for the remaining two days would have 
ܪ ൐ ܪ௨. For simplicity, we will refer to cases in which ܪ ൐ ܪ௨ as cases of overtime work, and to cases in which ܪ ൏ ܪ௨	 as cases of undertime. Descriptive statistics on overtime and undertime are reported in Section D of the 
online appendix. 
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involvement that is typically not specified in a contract. This may imply a reduction in 
overtime work or an increase in the take-up rate of leaves or in absenteeism. It is reasonable 
to expect that cross-effects mostly occur through reductions in ܪ െ ܪ௨, since these would not 
require the renegotiation of one’s labor contract, and are more easily under an employee’s 
individual control than adjustments in ܪ௨. On the other hand, the direct effect of the law is 
expected to bite on ܪ௨, consistently with the collective nature of these agreements. 
Estimates reported in Table 4 shed light on these adjustment margins. The sample 
period is now restricted to 1994-2002, as information on usual hours is unavailable from 2003 
onwards. Estimates in Panel A refer to men. Columns 1 and 2 show that, as anticipated, the 
first-stage effect of the workweek reduction in their wives’ firms mostly bites on usual hours 
(-1.75), while the effect on nonusual hours is much weaker (-0.54). By contrast, columns 3 
and 4 show that the reduced-form effect of the reform on own hours works entirely via a 
reduction in nonusual hours (-0.62), with no cross-effect on usual hours (-0.05), and thus no 
need to renegotiate own work schedules for men responding to their wives’ work schedules. 
For women (Panel B), we detect very similar first-stage effects as for men, but a small, albeit 
positive, cross-effect on ܪ௨ (0.17). 
Changes in nonusual hours and earnings are further explored in Table 5. Columns 1 
and 2 report cross-hour effects on overtime hours and undertime hours separately. These are 
defined as ሺܪ െ ܪ௨ሻା ൌ maxሺܪ െ ܪ௨, 0ሻ and ሺܪ െ ܪ௨ሻି ൌ maxሺܪ௨ െ ܪ, 0ሻ, respectively. 
Cross-hour effects feature strongly on undertime hours (0.54), while overtime hours are 
hardly affected (-0.07). Cross-effects on undertime hours in turn involve an increase in the 
frequency of both unworked weeks (ܪ ൌ 0, column 3) and unusually short workweeks 
(0 ൏ ܪ ൏ ܪ௨, column 4), but no change at all in full-time status (column 5). For cases in 
which ܪ ൏ ܪ௨, respondents are asked whether they worked less than usual in the reference 
week due to holidays and absence for personal reasons, sickness leave, maternity leave, 
continuous training, unusual workload, strike, or lock-out. While we detected significant 
cross-hour effects for holidays and sickness leaves, which are margins on which employees 
have closer control, we found no evidence of cross-effects on any other margin (results not 
reported).13  
Finally, we do not find any detrimental cross-effect on male earnings (column 6), 
consistently with evidence on the contribution of various components of actual hours (usual, 
                                                 
13 Information on the take-up rate of paid leaves and paid and unpaid overtime work contained in later waves of 
the LFS (2003-2009) confirms that there exists significant leeway for most employees, and especially for the 
high-skilled, in reducing their unpaid involvement at work. 
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overtime and undertime, respectively) to monthly earnings, as illustrated in Table C1 in the 
online appendix. Interestingly, undertime hours turn out to be the sole component of labor 
supply that men may cut unilaterally without earning losses. 
No hours margin is significantly affected for women (Panel B), except the incidence of 
part-time work, which falls by nearly 1 percentage point. The slight increase in the usual 
workweek and the corresponding change in full-time status are accompanied by an increase in 
earnings (2%), in line with the fact that usual hours are the labor supply component that best 
predicts earnings (Table C1).  
In summary, we detect substantial differences in both the magnitude and nature of 
spillover effects across genders. Specifically, cross-effects do not entail the renegotiation of 
usual hours with employers or changes in earnings for men, but involve instead a reduction in 
their unusual work involvement, whether within a given day, or through an increase in the 
take-up rate of paid vacation or sick leave, with no detrimental impact on (current) earnings. 
A reason why men may work some unpaid hours in the first place is that these may have an 
impact on future, as opposite to current, earnings, to the extent that someone who is more 
absent from work may lose on prospects of promotion and/or earnings growth. Another 
possible explanation is that some individuals may derive utility from work per se. Regardless 
of the underlying mechanism, our results show that men decide to cut on such unpaid hours 
following their wives’ treatment, as increased spousal nonmarket time would raise the utility 
of their own nonmarket time relative to the utility of being at work.  
Women, by contrast, are more often working part-time and less often spending unpaid, 
nonusual hours at work. Compared to men, it is on average more costly for women to adjust 
hours downward, insofar they have lower nonusual hours margins than men, but less costly to 
adjust hours upward, as in the public sector and large private sector firms employees can 
easily shift from part-time to full-time status, and only among women is the incidence of part-
time work substantial. The French reform thus provides a clean example of the role of 
optimization frictions in shaping the magnitude and nature of social spillovers. 
C. Heterogeneous Cross-hour Effects 
As working hours, constraints and preferences may vary widely across individuals, cross-hour 
effects may differ across occupations and the household composition of workers. Workers in 
high-skill occupations (managers, professionals and associate occupations) on average work 
longer hours than the less-skilled and typically have higher control over the organization of 
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their workweek, while the less-skilled are more likely to work the legal workweek and thus 
would only be able to cut their working hours via new contractual agreements.  
Panels A and B in Table 6 replicate our previous analysis on actual hours for 
employees in high-skill occupations and other employees, respectively. First-stage effects 
reported in column 1 have conventional magnitude and significance. For men, the associated 
cross-effect on hours is about three times larger for high-skill occupations (column 2) than for 
other occupations (column 3). Similar conclusions can be drawn by looking at the probability 
of working more than 45 hours weekly (columns 3 and 6). Spillover effects on men’s labor 
supply thus seem much stronger for the high-skilled than for the less-skilled.14 For women, 
we do not find significant cross-effects on overall working hours, but we do find a negative 
and significant impact on the probability that females in high-skill occupations work long 
weeks. This is the only subsample and only outcome variable for which we detect symmetric 
cross-effects for men and women. We found in Section III.A that women are slightly less 
likely to work very long hours when their husbands are treated (Figure 8), and we note here 
that for female managers and professionals this effect is as strong as for men, suggesting that 
when women have enough leeway to cut their hours – either because they work very long 
hours in the first place or they have managerial control – their labor supply response is 
qualitatively similar to that of men. However, the subsample of such women is too small, and 
their labor supply response too weak, for this effect to be discernible on the full sample. 
We further explore spousal labor supply responses across household types. It has been 
argued that interdependences in spousal labor supply may be stronger in the presence of 
young children, as children appear to play the role of a jointly-consumed commodity for 
husbands and wives (Lundberg, 1988). Panels C and D of Table 6 cover households with at 
least one child aged 0-6, and other households separately. We find weaker first-stage effects 
for mothers of young children than for other women, in line with higher incidence of part-
time work among mothers, as for part-timers the mandatory workweek reduction is not 
necessarily binding. Reduced-form regressions show a much stronger labor supply reaction 
for fathers of young kids than other men, despite a weaker first stage. For women, cross-
effects are somewhat mixed, as we detect a positive, rather than negative, cross-hour effect for 
mothers of young kids, and a negative cross-effect on the probability to work long weeks for 
other women.  
                                                 
14In the online appendix, we also show that cross-effects for men are stronger in the public than in the private 
sector, consistently with the presumption that public employees in France tend to have, other things equal, 
greater control than private employees in organizing their working time (see Table D1, Panel A). 
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IV.	Robustness Analysis 
The identifying assumption underlying our main estimates is that a respondent’s unobserved 
characteristics be uncorrelated to the timing of adoption of the shorter workweek in his or her 
spouse’s firm. One may think of scenarios in which this assumption is potentially violated, 
and we perform a number of robustness tests that should address various caveats to a causal 
interpretation of our estimates.  
First, one should worry about the existence of differential pre-existing trends in 
working hours between treatment and control groups. However, the event-study type of 
evidence presented in Figures 2-7 clearly shows that this is not the case, as pre-trends are in 
all cases parallel or even flat. This is also confirmed by estimates of reduced-form 
specifications that control for treatment-specific trends, reported in columns 1 and 4 of Table 
E1 in the online appendix. Columns 3 and 6 in Table E1 further control for region*year 
interactions, capturing the effect of local shocks, and show virtually unchanged estimates 
from columns 1 and 4, respectively. 
Second, our identifying assumption would be violated if spouses of employees in 
firms adopting the shorter workweek were subject to systematically different shocks or 
changes in unobservables around time of adoption, versus spouses of employees in non-
adopting firms. If changes in unobservables of treatment and control groups would generate 
spurious changes to their labor supply, one would possibly expect to observe some change in 
some of their observables as well around the time of treatment. But Table E2 shows no 
evidence of any significant change in such characteristics upon treatment. Third, we take into 
account concerns of reverse causality, namely the possibility that changes in own labor supply 
behavior may affect spousal job mobility between adopting and nonadopting firms, and 
replicate our reduced-form specifications on a subsample of spouses of job-stayers (online 
appendix, page 5).   
Finally, one may worry that in general employees in adopting (or early-adopting) 
firms would have systematically different spouses from employees in nonadopting (or late-
adopting) firms. To address this concern, we provide fixed-effect estimates of the effects of 
interest, based on a (limited) rotating panel component of the LFS (Table E4). This last 
robustness test confirms our main estimates15.  
                                                 
15We also checked that our estimates are very similar whether identification only relies on variation in hours 
across treated and nontreated spouses, or across early and late-treated spouses (Section E.2 in the online 
appendix). 
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V. Instrumental Variable Estimates of Cross-hour Effects 
There is a long standing tradition of labor supply models in which the decisions of each 
spouse depend on the number of hours spent at work by the other spouse (see Lundberg, 
1988, for a seminal example). These models are hard to estimate as they involve a system of 
two simultaneous equations in which wives’ hours feature in the husbands’ labor supply 
equation and vice versa, and good instruments for independent variation in the labor supply of 
one of the spouses are typically hard to find. In such scenario the French workweek reform 
helps identify the effects of interest by generating exogenous variation in the labor supply of 
one’s spouse. 
While the previous sections have highlighted the reduced-form effect of workweek 
regulations on spousal labor supply, in this section we use workweek regulations in an 
individual’s firm as an instrument for her working hours in her spouse’s labor supply 
equation. Under the exclusion restriction that workweek regulations affect spousal labor 
supply only via their effect on the labor supply of directly treated employees, IV estimates 
provide the parameter of interest for measuring how labor supply responds to independent 
changes in labor supply of one’s spouse, and may be generalized to a variety of scenarios. 
The structural interpretation of this parameter, as well as of its variation across 
genders, relies on the underlying model of intra-household interactions, and in particular on 
whether one assumes the household decision making process to be cooperative or non-
cooperative. In non-cooperative models (see for instance Bourguignon, 1984, Chen and 
Woolley, 2001, Lechene and Preston, 2011), each spouse maximizes an individual utility 
function, taking the decisions of the other spouse as given. The arguments of such utility 
functions may include own as well as spousal use of time. In this framework cross-hour 
effects represent the effect of spousal labor supply on the marginal utility of substituting time 
spent at work with leisure. Asymmetric cross-hour effects can be easily generated in this 
context by different utility functions for men and women, such that men’s utility of leisure 
would respond to wives’ leisure, but not viceversa. In cooperative household models (see, 
among others, McElroy and Horney, 1981, Chiappori, 1988, Apps and Rees, 1988), the 
household jointly maximizes a utility function, strictly increasing in the utility of each spouse. 
In this case it can be shown that estimated cross-hour effects for men and women stem from 
the same set of parameters in spouses’ utility functions and, consequently, strongly 
asymmetric cross-hour effects for men and women are less straightforward to rationalize, 
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unless women are initially trapped at a corner solution characterized by zero unpaid time at 
work  (see detailed discussion in Section F of the online appendix). 
Below we report estimates of the impact of spousal hours on own hours, having 
instrumented spousal hours by ܣܲ݋ݏݐௌ. The regression results are reported in Table 7 for men 
(Panel A) and women (Panel B), using the same samples and specifications as in Tables 3 and 
6. Among men, the average cross-hour effect in labor supply is 0.23, but about twice as large 
for managers and professionals than for other occupations. When their wives cut their labor 
supply by one hour, men in high occupations respond to by cutting their own labor supply by 
about 20 minutes. Also, cross-effects are three times larger in the presence of young children, 
relative to other households. The quantitative response for fathers is about 35 minutes for each 
extra hour spent at home by their wives, suggesting that worktime policy evaluations 
restricted to direct labor supply effects may strongly underestimate its impact on the time 
spent by fathers with their young children. For women we detect no significant cross-hour 
effect on the whole sample or across the occupational divide, but we do find a negative, 
marginally significant cross-effect for mothers of young kids. 
These estimates can be used to quantitatively evaluate the social multiplier, i.e. the gap 
between aggregate and individual effects of a labor supply shock. Macroeconomic 
calibrations existing in the literature typically imply much higher labor supply elasticities than 
individual-level estimates (Chetty et al. 2011a,b), and spousal labor supply complementarities 
represent an important channel for such gap. Our estimates reveal a strongly asymmetric 
structure of spillovers, whereby women’s treatment affects male labor supply but not 
viceversa (with very few exceptions). Specifically, an average cross-hour effects of 0.23 for 
husbands and a negligible one for wives means that a unit change in individual hours 
translates into a change in household labor supply of 2.23. This implies a macro response that 
is 2.23/2-1=11.5% higher than the micro response for the average household. As discussed by 
Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (2003), the role of social interactions and social 
multipliers may vary widely across demographic groups and levels of aggregation, and the 
French workweek reform provides a clean experiment to identify the multiplier in labor 
supply at the household level. 
Finally, our findings on specific margins of adjustments of weekly hours reveal that, 
due to search frictions and hours constraints, it is mostly nonusual hours that respond to 
spouse treatment, leaving usual hours largely unchanged. Thus the above estimates of the 
social multiplier are likely attenuated by optimization frictions, and may be interpreted as a 
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lower bound for macro elasticities that one would observe absent frictions (Chetty et al., 
2011a, Chetty, 2012).    
VI.  Conclusions 
We have investigated cross-hour effects in the labor supply of couples using independent 
variation in spousal hours generated by changes in worktime regulations. In particular we 
exploit independent variation in spousal hours at constant monthly earnings, which allows us 
to abstract from income effects of changes in spousal labor supply, and focus on pure cross-
hour effects. While wives of treated men hardly adjust their working time, husbands of treated 
women respond by cutting their workweek by about half an hour to one hour, according to 
specifications and samples. Such gender differences in cross-hour effects are remarkable; 
especially insofar women’s labor supply elasticity is typically higher than men’s (Blundell 
and MaCurdy, 1999). These results suggest significant spousal complementarities in leisure 
time for men. While we do not find strong evidence on different preferences by gender, 
insofar women work shorter hours in the first place and are less likely than men to have 
managerial control, they may be more heavily constrained in the organization of their working 
time.  
Our results on cross-hour effects are noteworthy as they show that neglecting spousal 
responses may give a misleading view of the overall impact of labor supply shocks. In 
particular, evaluations restricted to the direct impact of policy on the targeted population are 
likely to underestimate its overall effect on labor supply. A simple back-of-envelope 
calculation suggests a social multiplier around 1.11, thus neglecting spillovers within the 
household would yield an underestimate of the overall policy impact on labor supply by about 
11%. Finally, cross-hour effects vary widely across household types, and tend to be strongest 
in the presence of young children, with policy relevant effects on the time spent by fathers 
with their offspring.   
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Table 1 
Distribution of Own Treatment, by Spouse’s Treatment (%) 
 
Panel A Employed men 
 Wife not treated Wife treated 
Own firm never adopted shorter workweek 71.0 54.2 
Own firm adopted shorter workweek 29.0 45.8 
    - not same year as wife’s firm 29.0 22.8 
    - same year as wife’s firm - 23.0 
Total  100 100 
Panel B Employed women 
 Husband not treated Husband treated 
Own firm never adopted shorter workweek 73.2 58.1 
Own firm adopted shorter workweek 26.8 41.9 
   - not same year as wife’s firm 26.8 21.3 
   - same year as wife’s firm - 20.6 
Total  100 100 
 
Notes. The sample includes employed respondents. The interpretation of figures is as follows: among employed 
males whose spouse works in a treated firm, 45.8% are working in a treated firm. 
Source: French LFS, 1994-2009, Insee. 
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Table 2 
First-stage Regressions  
Direct Effects of the Shorter Workweek on Hours and Earnings 
 
Panel A Men 
 Wives’ hours  Wives’ (log) earnings 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
ܣܲ݋ݏݐௌ -1.81** 
(0.13) 
-1.91** 
(0.10) 
 0.002 
(0.010) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
Additional controls no Yes  no yes 
Mean dep. variable 30.05 30.05  8.658 8.658 
No. Observations 189,894 189,894  160,046 160,046 
Panel B Women 
 Husband’s hours  Husband’s (log) earnings 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
ܣܲ݋ݏݐௌ -1.95** 
(0.13) 
-1.92** 
(0.14) 
 0.017* 
(0.008) 
0.007 
(0.004) 
Additional controls  no Yes  no yes 
Mean dep. variable 37.07 37.07  9.011 9.011 
No. Observations 236,802 236,802  201,559 201,559 
 
Notes. The table shows results from first-stage regressions for hours and earnings of spouses. Columns 1 and 2 
refer to the full sample (married or cohabiting respondents whose spouse in an employee). Columns 3 and 4 refer 
to the subsample whose spouses have nonmissing earnings (from 2003 onwards, information on earnings is 
collected on one third of the LFS sample). Baseline controls include ܣௌ,	15 year dummies and a dummy for 
public sector. Additional controls include years of education, age, age squared and 16 industry dummies. 
Standard errors clustered at the treatment*year level are reported in brackets. ** and * denote significance at the 
1% and 5% levels, respectively.  
Source: French LFS, 1994-2009, Insee.  
 
.
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Table 3 
Reduced-form Regressions 
Cross-effects of the Shorter Workweek on Employment and Hours 
 
Notes. The table shows results from reduced-form regressions in which own employment status and hours are 
regressed on spousal treatment (ܣௌ and ܣܲ݋ݏݐௌ), as well as on own treatment (ܣ and ܣܲ݋ݏݐ). Columns 1 and 2 
refer to the full sample. Columns 3 and 4 refer to the subsample of employed respondents. Column 5 refers to 
employed respondents who were not treated at the same time as their spouses. Column 6 refers to employed 
respondents who were never treated. Baseline controls in columns 1 and 2 include ܣௌ, 15 year dummies and 
spouse’s public sector dummy. Additional controls in column 2 are own years of education, age and age square, 
and spouse’s years of education, age and age square. Baseline controls in columns 3-6 include ܣ, ܣௌ, 15 year 
dummies, own public sector and wage-earner dummies, and a spouse’s public sector dummy. Additional controls 
in columns 4-6 include own years of education, age, age square and 16 industry dummies, and spouse’s years of 
education, age, age square, and 16 industry dummies. Standard errors clustered at the treatment*year level are 
reported in brackets. ** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.  
Source: French LFS, 1994-2009, Insee. 
Panel A Men 
 Own employment 
 
 Own hours 
(conditional on employment) 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ܣܲ݋ݏݐௌ -0.0037 
(0.0027) 
-0.0028 
(0.0022) 
 -0.44** 
(0.09) 
-0.45** 
(0.09) 
-0.50** 
(0.09) 
-0.44** 
(0.10) 
ܣܲ݋ݏݐ - -  -1.96** 
(0.14) 
-1.96** 
(0.14) 
-2.02** 
(0.13) 
- 
 
Further controls  no yes  No yes yes yes 
Mean dep. variable 0.8819 0.8819  38.89 38.89 38.97 39.55 
No. observations 189,894 189,894  167,460 167,460 156,392 115,445 
Panel B Women 
 Own employment 
 
 Own hours  
(conditional on employment) 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ܣܲ݋ݏݐௌ -0.0032 
(0.0023) 
-0.0041 
(0.0022) 
 0.12 
(0.10) 
0.05 
(0.11) 
0.06 
(0.11) 
0.07 
(0.11) 
ܣܲ݋ݏݐ    -1.86** 
(0.17) 
-1.88** 
(0.15) 
-1.86** 
(0.18) 
- 
 
Further controls  no yes  no yes yes yes 
Mean dep. variable 0.6786 0.6786  30.32 30.32 30.25 30.04 
No. observations 236,802 236,802  160,689 160,689 150,371 116,596 
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Table 4 
First-stage and Reduced-form Regressions 
Direct and Cross-effects of the Shorter Workweek on Usual and Nonusual Hours  
 
Panel A Men 
 First stage  Reduced form 
 
Wife’s usual 
Hours 
ܪ௨ 
Wife’s 
actual–usual 
hours 
ܪ െ ܪ௨ 
 
Own 
usual hours 
ܪ௨ 
Own 
actual–usual 
hours 
ܪ െ ܪ௨ 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
ܣܲ݋ݏݐௌ -1.75** 
(0.15) 
-0.54** 
(0.16)  
-0.05 
(0.05) 
-0.62** 
(0.14) 
Mean dep. var. 33.79 -4.46  39.24 -3.17 
No. obs. 97,470 97,470  97,470 97,470 
Panel B Women 
 First stage  Reduced form 
 Husband’s 
usual 
Hours 
ܪ௨ 
Husband’s 
actual–usual 
hours 
ܪ െ ܪ௨
 
Own 
usual hours 
ܪ௨ 
Own 
actual–usual 
hours 
ܪ െ ܪ௨ 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
ܣܲ݋ݏݐௌ -2.02** 
(0.12) 
-0.46 
(0.23)  
0.17* 
(0.08) 
0.06 
(0.10) 
Mean dep. var. 39.17 -3.18  33.33 -4.28 
No. obs. 102,123 102,123  102,123 102,123 
 
Notes. Regressions refer to the employed subsample with nonmissing own and spouse’s usual hours. Control variables in columns 1 and 2 
are the same as in column 2 of Table 2, and in columns 3-4 they are the same as in column 4 of Table 3. Standard errors clustered at the 
treatment*year level are reported in brackets. ** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.  
Source: French LFS, 1994-2002, Insee 
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Table 5 
Reduced-form Regressions 
Cross-effects of the Shorter Workweek on Types of Hours Worked and Earnings  
 
Panel A  Men 
 
 
Own 
overtime 
hours 
ሺܪ െ ܪ௎ሻା 
Own 
undertime 
hours 
ሺܪ െ ܪ௎ሻି 
Own 
unworked  
weeks 
ܪ ൌ 0 
Own 
unusually 
short 
workweeks 
0 ൏ ܪ ൏ ܪ௎ 
Own 
part-time 
Own (log) 
earnings 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ܣܲ݋ݏݐௌ 
 -0.07 (0.03) 
-0.54** 
(0.11) 
0.012** 
(0.003) 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
Mean dep. var.  0.86 -4.03 0.088 0.065 0.031 9.004 
No. obs.  97,470 97,470 97,470 97,470 97,470 97,470 
Panel B  Women 
 
 
Own 
overtime 
hours 
ሺܪ െ ܪ௎ሻା 
Own 
undertime 
hours 
ሺܪ െ ܪ௎ሻି 
Own 
unworked  
weeks 
ܪ ൌ 0 
Own 
unusually 
short 
workweeks 
0 ൏ ܪ ൏ ܪ௎ 
Own 
part-time 
Own (log) 
earnings 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ܣܲ݋ݏݐௌ 
 -0.06 (0.03) 
0.12 
(0.10) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
-0.012** 
(0.004) 
0.020** 
(0.004) 
Mean dep. var.  0.56 -4.84 0.129 0.061 0.323 8.587 
No. obs.  102,123 102,123 102,123 102,123 102,123 102,123 
 
Notes. Regressions refer to the employed subsample with nonmissing own and spouse’s usual hours. Control variables are the same as in 
column 4 of Table 3. In column 2, the interpretation of positive coefficients is that the fall in labor supply is now picked up by an increase 
in undertime hours. Standard errors clustered at the treatment*year level are reported in brackets. ** and * denote significance at the 1% 
and 5% levels, respectively.  
Source: French LFS, 1994-2002, Insee 
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Table 6 
Heterogeneous Effects of the Shorter Workweek, by Occupation and Family Type 
 
Notes. Regressions refer to the employed subsample. In columns 1 and 4, control variables are the same as in 
column 4 of Table 3, and in columns 2, 3, 5, 6 they are the same as in column 4 of Table 4. Standard errors 
clustered at the treatment*year level are reported in brackets. ** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% 
levels, respectively.  
Source: French LFS, 1994-2009, Insee. 
Panel A Men  
 Managers, profs. and kindred  occup.  Other  occupations 
 First stage  Reduced form  First stage  Reduced form 
 Wife’s 
hours 
(1) 
 Own hours 
 
(2) 
Own hours 
≥ 45 
(3) 
 Wife’s 
hours 
(4) 
 Own hours  
 
(5) 
Own hours 
≥ 45 
(6) 
ܣܲ݋ݏݐௌ -2.32** 
(0.30) 
 -0.81** 
(0.27) 
-0.033** 
(0.009) 
 -1.72** 
(0.11) 
 -0.32** 
(0.09) 
-0.006** 
(0.002) 
Mean dep. var 29.80  40.91 0.447  30.20  38.44 0.217 
No. obs. 30,432  30,432 30,432  137,028  137,028 137,028 
Panel B Women 
 Managers, profs. and kindred  occup.  Other  occupations 
 First stage  Reduced form  First stage  Reduced form 
 Husband’s 
hours 
(1) 
 Own hours 
 
(2) 
Own hours 
≥ 45 
(3) 
 Husband’s 
hours 
(4) 
 Own hours  
 
(5) 
Own hours 
≥ 45 
(6) 
ܣܲ݋ݏݐௌ -2.51** 
(0.40) 
 -0.17 
(0.34) 
-0.034** 
(0.008) 
 -2.03** 
(0.13) 
 0.15 
(0.11) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
Mean dep. var 38.51  32.03 0.196  36.91  30.14 0.069 
No. obs. 15,217  15,217 15,217  145,472  145,472 145,472 
Panel C Men 
 At least one child aged 0-6  No children aged 0-6 
 First stage  Reduced form  First stage  Reduced form 
 Wife’s 
hours 
(1) 
 Own hours 
 
(2) 
Own hours 
≥ 45 
(3) 
 Wife’s 
hours 
(4) 
 Own hours  
 
(5) 
Own hours 
≥ 45 
(6) 
ܣܲ݋ݏݐௌ -1.30** 
(0.23)
 -0.81** 
(0.28)
-0.028** 
(0.008)
 -2.08** 
(0.13)
 -0.34** 
(0.12) 
-0.003 
(0.003)
Mean dep. var 27.53  38.85 0.260  30.93  38.91 0.259 
No. obs. 39,468  39,468 39,468  127,992  127,992 127,992 
Panel D   Women  
 At least one child aged 0-6  No children aged 0-6 
 First stage  Reduced form  First stage  Reduced form 
 Husband’s 
hours 
(1) 
 Own hours 
 
(2) 
Own hours 
≥ 45 
(3) 
 Husband’s 
hours 
(4) 
 Own hours  
 
(5) 
Own hours 
≥ 45 
(6) 
ܣܲ݋ݏݐௌ -2.25** 
(0.24) 
 0.49 
(0.25) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
 -2.04** 
(0.11) 
 -0.08 
(0.10) 
-0.005* 
(0.002) 
Mean dep. var 37.16  27.94 0.063  37.03  31.03 0.086 
No. obs. 36,959  36,959 36,959  123,730  123,730 123,730 
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Table 7 
IV Estimates of Cross-hour Effects 
 
Panel A Employed men 
 Own hours 
 All  High-skilled Other 
occupation 
One or more 
child 0-6 
Other 
households 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Wife’s hours 0.23** 
(0.05) 
0.34**
(0.12) 
0.18**
(0.05) 
0.59** 
(0.21) 
0.16**
(0.06) 
Mean dep. variable 38.89 40.91 38.44 38.85 38.91 
No. observations 167,460 30,432 137,028 39,468 127,992 
Panel B  Employed women 
 Own hours 
 All  High-skilled Other 
occupation 
One or more 
child 0-6 
Other 
households 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Husband’s hours -0.02 
(0.05) 
0.08
(0.13) 
-0.07
(0.06) 
-0.23 
(0.12) 
0.04
(0.05) 
Mean dep. variable 30.32 32.03 30.14 27.94 31.03 
No. observations 160,689 15,217 145,472 36,959 123,730 
 
Notes. Regressions refers to the employed subsample. Estimates reported show the effect of spousal hours (ܪௌ) 
on own hours (ܪ), using spousal treatment (ܣܲ݋ݏݐௌ) as an instrument. The corresponding reduced-form results 
are reported in Tables 3 and 6. Further controls include ܣ, ܣܲ݋ݏݐ, ܣௌ, 15 year dummies, a wage-earner dummy 
and the following variables for each spouse: a public sector dummy, years of education, age, age square, and 16 
industry dummies. Standard errors clustered at the treatment*year level are reported in brackets. ** and * denote 
significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.  
Source: French LFS, 1994-2009, Insee. 
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Figure 1. Timing of Implementation of the Shorter Workweek:  
Percentage of Employees Treated 
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Figure 2. Wives' Hours Worked, by Own Treatment 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Men's Employment Rates, by Wife’s Treatment 
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Figure 4. Men's Hours Worked, by Wife’s Treatment. 
 
 
  
Figure 5. Husbands' Hours Worked, by Own Treatment. 
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Figure 6. Women's Employment Rates, by Husband’s Treatment. 
 
 
  
Figure 7. Women's Hours Worked, by Husband’s Treatment. 
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Panel A: Men 
 
 
Panel B: Women  
 
Figure 8. Estimated Cross-effects on the Cumulative Distribution of Hours 
 
Notes: For each ݇ between 15 and 49, the solid lines show the cross effect on the probability of working longer 
than ݇, i.e. ܲݎሺܪ ൐ ݇ሻ. Dashed lines show the corresponding 95% confidence intervals. 
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A. Descriptive Statistics 
Table A1 provides some basic descriptive statistics on our sample, distinguishing between 
male and female respondents, and by the treatment status of their spouses. The age and years 
of education of both men and women are very similar whether or not their spouses are treated, 
although they are more likely to work in the private sector when their spouses are treated, 
consistent with stronger impact of the reform in the private sector and some degree of 
assortative mating.  
Figures A1 and A2 show the distribution of actual and usual working hours, 
respectively, in the pre-policy period, i.e. for workers whose employers have not yet signed an 
agreement. Clear spikes in correspondence of 39 hours can be detected for both men and 
women in the pre-policy period, and as one would expect spikes are more marked in the 
distribution of usual than actual hours. Reassuringly, there is no evidence of “early” spikes in 
correspondence of ܪ௎ ൌ 35 in the pre-treatment hours distribution of later treated firms. In 
fact, spikes at ܪ௎ ൌ 35	appear (and spikes at ܪ௎ ൌ 39	disappear) exactly upon treatment. For 
example, among firms treated in 2001, the density at ܪ௎ ൌ 35 remains stable below 6% until 
2001 and jumps above 47% in 2002 (and the density at ܪ௎ ൌ 39 remains stable at about 50% 
until 2001 and falls to 12% in 2002) 
B. Further Evidence on Cross-effects on Actual Hours 
Figure B1 represents differences in hours for treated and non-treated employees by distance 
from treatment (i.e. the difference version of Figures 2 and 5), together with the 
corresponding 95% confidence interval, having normalized to zero such difference at time 
zero. The Figure highlights flat pre-treatment differences, followed by a permanent two hour 
drop in correspondence of treatment. Reduced-form effects on spouses are shown in Figure 
B2: while for men one can detect a permanent drop in hours worked, induced by wives’ 
treatment, for women the difference in hours stays essentially flat, with no discernible change 
upon treatment.  
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As the observed cross-effects might be partly induced by cases of simultaneous 
treatment of spouses, Figures B3 and B4 complement evidence presented in Figure 4 in the 
paper by showing men’s hours worked by wife’s treatment status, excluding men treated at 
the same time as their wives, and men ever treated, respectively. These figures show a very 
similar pattern as Figure 4, i.e. upon their wife’s treatment men on average cut their labor 
supply relative to men whose wives are not treated, and this result holds whether or not one 
includes men who are themselves treated. To the extent that treatments of spouses are 
correlated over time, the evidence presented in Figures B3 and B4 should alleviate concerns 
about our identification strategy. 
Finally, we show in Figure B5 that adjusting the series for hours differences for all 
observables included in specification 4 of Table 3 leaves the main picture virtually unchanged 
from Figure B2.  
C. Usual hours, Non-usual Hours and Earnings. 
In our sample usual hours ܪ௨ are defined for about 85% of cases. For these, ܪ ൌ ܪ௨	in 73% 
of cases, ܪ ൐ ܪ௨ in 11.6% of cases, and ܪ ൏ ܪ௨ in the remaining 15.4% of cases. 
Conditional on ܪ ൏ ܪ௨, 57% of cases correspond to ܪ ൌ 0, and among them the average 
number of undertime hours is 38, and 43% of cases correspond to 0 ൏ ܪ ൏ ܪ௨, and among 
them the average number of undertime hours is 10. Conditional on ܪ ൐ ܪ௨, the average 
number of overtime hours is 7.4. 
We have shown in Section III.B that cross-hour effects for men mostly happen through 
variations in ܪ െ ܪ௨ rather than in ܪ௨, and specifically through an increase in undertime 
hours ሺܪ െ ܪ௨ሻି. For women, we detected a milder but positive cross-effect on ܪ௨, 
associated to a rise in earnings. Here we relate our findings on cross-effects on hours and 
earnings to evidence from the decomposition of total earnings into a component explained by 
usual hours and a component explained by non-usual hours. Table C1 reports estimates from 
regressions of monthly earnings on ܪ௨, ሺܪ െ ܪ௨ሻା and ሺܪ െ ܪ௨ሻି separately, and shows that 
earnings significantly respond to usual hours Hu for both men and women, while undertime 
hours ሺܪ െ ܪ௨ሻି have no discernible impact on male earnings. In other words, ሺܪ െ ܪ௨ሻି 
turns out to be the sole component of labor supply that men may cut without bearing losses in 
earnings, while increments in ܪ௨ do generate earnings gains. This evidence is in line with our 
estimated cross-effects on earnings. 
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D. Cross-hour Effects in the Public and the Private Sector 
We provide further evidence on heterogeneous effects by showing in Table D1 separate 
results for the public and the private sector. Estimates reported in Panel A imply a cross-effect 
for males in the public sector of 36 minutes (column 1), while the corresponding figure for 
men in the private sector is only 15 minutes (column 2). Interestingly, when one selects 
private employees with open-ended contracts and tenure longer than two years,1 the estimated 
labor supply response rises to about 22 minutes (column 3). In line with our main estimates of 
Table 3, Panel B shows lack of cross-effect for women in either the public or the private 
sector. 
E. Robustness Tests 
E.1  Unobserved Heterogeneity 
The identifying assumption underlying our main estimates is that a respondent’s unobserved 
characteristics be uncorrelated to the timing of adoption of the shorter workweek in his or her 
spouse’s firm. One could think of a number of scenarios in which this identifying assumption 
may be potentially violated, and this subsection provides results of robustness tests that 
should address various caveats to a causal interpretation of our estimates. 
First, one should worry about the existence of differential pre-existing trends in 
working hours between treatment and control groups, and about the impact of local shocks, 
which would affect spouses in a similar way. To address these concerns, we estimate first-
stage and reduced-form specifications that control for treatment-specific trends and 
region*year interactions. The results are reported in Table E1 and show a first-stage effect of 
the workweek reduction that is virtually identical to that reported in Table 2. The 
corresponding reduced-form effect is very similar to that reported in Table 3, albeit slightly 
less precise, but still significant at the 5% level.2  
Second, our identifying assumption would be violated if spouses of employees in 
firms adopting the shorter workweek were subject to systematically different changes in 
unobservables around time of adopting, versus spouses of employees in non- adopting firms. 
                                                 
1 Within two years of tenure there are no mandated severance payments and the advance notice for dismissal is 
one month instead of two. 
2 We also run typical placebo tests by estimating first-stage and cross-effects on the 1994-1998 pre-reform 
period and the 2002-2006 post-reform period, having created artificial treatment dates four years before and four 
years after actual treatment dates, and found no significant coefficients on the newly created ܣܲ݋ݏݐ and ܣܲ݋ݏݐௌ 
interaction terms. 
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As the time of signing and policy adoption is staggered across firms, one may be less worried 
about aggregate trends affecting various outcomes differently at signing versus non-signing 
firms, than in the case of simultaneous treatment. Nevertheless, the timing of treatment may 
be endogenous from a firm’s point of view (though not as much from an individual 
employee’s point of view, and even less from his/her spouse’s point of view), and more in 
general there could be differential labor supply movements in the treatment and control 
groups that are unrelated to the adoption of the shorter workweek.  
 If changes in unobservables of treament and control groups would generate spurious 
changes to their labor supply, one would expect to observe some change in some of their 
observables as well around the time of treatment. But we show in Table E2 that while there 
are significant pre-treatment differences in the age, education, public sector status, and 
industry of treatment and control groups (see coefficients on ܣௌ and ܣ variables), there is no 
evidence of any significant change in such characteristics upon treatment (see coefficients on 
ܣܲ݋ݏݐௌ and ܣܲ݋ݏݐ variables). 
Third, we take into account concerns of reverse causality, and namely the possibility 
that changes in own labor supply behavior may affect spousal job mobility between signing 
and non-signing firms. To do this we exploit information on job tenure with the current 
employer to select a subsample of workers whose spouses did not change employer during the 
adoption period 1998-2002. When estimating our usual reduced-form specification on the 
subsample of spouses of job-stayers, we find a cross-effect of -0.46 (s.e. 0.21) for men, and a 
cross-effect of 0.16 (s.e. 0.15) for women, and both estimates as well as their level of 
significance are very close to those found on the main sample in Table 3. 
Finally, one may worry that in general employees in adopting (or early-adopting) 
firms would have systematically different spouses from employees in nonadopting (or late-
adopting) firms. To address these concerns, we complement the above results with fixed-
effect estimates of the effects of interest. The French LFS has a rotating panel dimension, with 
one third of the sample being replaced each year, and each household staying in the sample 
for at most three survey years. When focusing on the 1998-2002 period,3 about 10% of 
respondents surveyed are observed both before and after the implementation of the shorter 
workweek in their spouses’ firms (see Table E3).  
                                                 
3Households surveyed either before 1998 or after 2002 did not experience any changes in working time 
regulations while in our panel, and thus cannot contribute to the identification of the effect of these changes on 
spousal labor supply. Our panel estimates thus focus on the 1998-2002 period.  
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Table E4 reports fixed-effect estimates of all parameters on interest, controlling for 
individual fixed-effects. Employment and earnings effects of the shorter workweek are again 
nil. The first-stage effect on hours is negative and significant for both men (-1.22) and women 
(-1.21), although this is somewhat smaller than the effect detected in cross-section estimates 
of Table 2. As fixed-effect estimates focus by construction on short-term effects of worktime 
agreements, while cross-sectional estimates exploit a longer horizon, one may think that the 
difference between the two may be due to some gradual implementation of the shorter 
workweek. Figures 2 and 5 show that this may be the case for husbands, though not for wives. 
Another possible interpretation is that fixed-effect estimates may be more seriously affected 
by measurement error in the actual date of implementation of the shorter workweek, which 
would generate a stronger attenuation bias than in cross-section estimates.  
The cross-hour effect for husbands is negative (-0.40), although this only becomes 
significant when one looks at the difference between actual and usual hours (-0.76), and again 
it is the amount of undertime hours that is adjusted following wives’ shorter workweeks 
(0.80). For wives, the cross-hour effect is either positive or close to zero, but never 
statistically significant. Overall, our main findings are robust to the introduction of individual 
fixed-effects, although as it is to be expected the significance of some of the coefficients of 
interest is reduced in this smaller sample. 
E.2  Alternative Sources of Identification 
The whole analysis of our paper uses two sources of identification for estimating cross-hour 
effects of the shorter workweek, and namely variation in hours between treated and 
nontreated spouses, as well as variation across the early and the late treated. In principle the 
two sources of variation should trigger the same type of labor supply responses and one may 
worry in case our main results were driven by one type of variation but not the other. In order 
to check the robustness of our estimates, this section replicates our main specifications using 
these two sources of identification separately. The first-stage regression is based the following 
specification,  
 ܪ௜௧ௌ ൌ ߙଵଵܣ௜௧ௌ ൅ ߙଵଶܣ௜௧ௌ ∗ ሺ1998 ൑ ݐ ൑ 2002ሻ	൅ ߙଶଵܣ௜௧ௌ ∗ ሺݐ ൐ 2002ሻ 		൅
																											൅ߙଶଶܣܲ݋ݏݐ௜௧ௌ ∗ ሺ1998 ൑ ݐ ൑ 2002ሻ ൅ ߙଷ ௜ܺ௧ௌ ൅ ܦ௧ ൅ ݑ௜௧.                (E1) 
The parameters of interest are ߙଶଵ and ߙଶଶ. The ߙଶଵ coefficient compares differences in hours 
between those ever treated and the nontreated after 2002. By contrast, the ߙଶଶ coefficient 
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compares hours worked by those treated later to hours worked by those treated earlier.4 The 
corresponding reduced-form equation is 
 ܪ௜௧ ൌ ߛଵଵܣ௜௧ௌ ൅ ߛଵଶܣ௜௧ௌ ∗ ሺ1998 ൑ ݐ ൑ 2002ሻ	൅ ߛଶଵܣ௜௧ௌ ∗ ሺݐ ൐ 2002ሻ 
																				൅ߛଶଶܣܲ݋ݏݐ௜௧ௌ ∗ ሺ1998 ൑ ݐ ൑ 2002ሻ ൅ ߛଷܣ௜௧ ൅ ߛସܣܲ݋ݏݐ௜௧ ൅ ߛହ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ܦ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧,     (E2) 
where ߛଶଵ and ߛଶଶ	are the parameters of interest. 
Columns 1 and 2 in Table E5 report the estimated first-stage effects on wives’ hours 
and earnings. Reassuringly, the estimates for first-stage effects ߙଶଵ and ߙଶଶ are both negative, 
highly significant, very similar to each other and very close to the overall effect obtained with 
our main specification (see Table 2). Column 3 reports reduced-form effects for their 
husbands. The estimates obtained for ߛଶଵ and ߛଶଶ are again negative, significant, close to each 
other and to the overall reduced-form effect reported in Table 3. 
For females, the estimated cross effects were still negative, but very small in 
magnitude and not significantly different from zero at standard levels, regardless of the source 
of identification (results not reported). 
F. Simple Interpretative Models 
Consider a married worker, working ܪ hours and enjoying ݈ hours of leisure, where ܪ and l	 
satisfy the usual (normalized) constraint ܪ ൅ ݈ ൌ 1. We assume that ܪ can be conceptualized 
as the sum of paid working hours ܮ and unpaid hours ܯ, where only ܯ is chosen by the 
worker, whereas ܮ is defined by a formal contract, depending on the institutional setting. As a 
result, earnings ܻ are constant, as the duration of paid work is exogenously set, and the only 
work margin under the worker’s control is unpaid. These assumptions are meant to capture in 
the simplest form the main institutional features of the French workweek regulations. 
Preferences can be represented by a well-behaved utility function 
   ܷሺ݈,ܯ,ܪௌ, ܥሻ ൌ ܷሺ݈, 1 െ ݈ െ ܮ, ܪௌ, ܥሻ,    (F1) 
where ܪௌ represents the number of hours worked by the spouse (with ܪௌ ൌ ܮௌ ൅ ܯௌ), and ܥ 
represents consumption, which we assume to be a household public good. The number of 
unpaid hours ܯ may enter the utility function either because investment at work is an intrinsic 
source of utility for the worker or because it is expected to increase the probability of 
                                                 
4Note that ܣܲ݋ݏݐ௜௧ௌ ൌ ܣܲ݋ݏݐ௜௧ௌ ∗ ሺ1998 ൑ ݐ ൑ 2002ሻ ൅ ܣ௜௧ௌ ∗ ሺݐ ൐ 2002ሻ, so that specifications (1) and (E1) are 
nested. In particular, specification (1) is a special case of (E1), in which one imposes ߙଵଵ ൌ ߙଵଶ and ߙଶଵ ൌ ߙଶଶ. 
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professional success in the future. Spousal labor supply ܪௌ  enters the utility function because 
the value of own leisure may depend on how many hours one’s spouse spends at work or, 
conversely, in the household.  
We consider first a non-cooperative household model in which each individual 
chooses ܯ and ݈ in order to maximize own utility ܷ, taking ܪௌ as given, and subject to the 
usual budget constraints ܮ ൅ܯ ൅ ݈ ൌ 1 and ܥ ൌ ܻ ൅ ܻௌ, where ܻௌ denotes spouse income.  
This problem is a special case of the more general set-up introduced by Pollak (1969) 
to describe “conditional demand functions”, i.e. consumer’s behavior when the quantity of 
one or more goods is rationed. In our specific case, the optimal ݈∗ represents the conditional 
demand for leisure by a worker whose paid hours are institutionally set. Optimal choices ݈∗ 
and ܯ∗	are functions of ܪௌ and household income ܻ ൅ ܻௌ, and optimal labor supply is simply 
ܪ∗ ൌ ܮ ൅ܯ∗.  
Using this notation, the first-stage effect of the workweek reduction is ߲ܪௌ∗/߲ܮௌ ൌ
1 ൅ ߲ܯௌ∗/߲ܮௌ and the cross-effect is ߲ܪ∗/߲ܮௌ ൌ ߲ܯ∗/߲ܮௌ. In our empirical context, the 
worktime regulation reform provides a source of variation in ܮௌ, which is independent of 
households’ earnings, and makes it possible to estimate this cross-hour effect.  
The relationship between the cross-hour effect and the characteristics of the utility 
function can be recovered by first obtaining first-order conditions of this maximization 
problem for ݈ and ܯ, and then differentiating with respect to ܯ and ܮௌ: 
																												߲ܪ
∗
߲ܮௌ ൌ
߲ܯ∗
߲ܮௌ ൌ
1
ݑଶ 	
߲ሺ ଵܷ െ ܷଶሻ
߲ܪௌ 	
߲ܪௌ∗
߲ܮௌ ൌ
ܷଶଷ െ ଵܷଷ
ݑଶ 	
߲ܪௌ∗
߲ܮௌ ,																												ሺF2ሻ 
where ௜ܷ denotes the partial derivative of ܷ with respect to its ݅th argument, ௜ܷ௝ denotes 
cross-derivatives, and ݑଶ ൌ െ ଵܷଵ ൅ 2 ଵܷଶ െ ܷଶଶ		is positive due to the concavity of ܷ.  
Conditional on positive direct effects, ߲ܪௌ∗/߲ܮௌ ൐ 0, one would detect positive cross-hour 
effects if ܷଶଷ ൐ ଵܷଷ, i.e. if spouse working time reduces the utility of leisure time more than it 
raises the utility of unpaid time spent at work. In other words, ܷଶଷ ൐ ଵܷଷ implies that an 
individual is willing to substitute time at work with time in the household when his or her 
spouse works less, consistent with complementarity in spousal leisure. In this context, 
positive cross-hour effects for men but not for women can be easily rationalized by ܷଶଷ െ
ଵܷଷ ൐ 0 and ܷଶଷௌ െ ଵܷଷௌ ൌ 0, where ܵ indexes women’s utility functions. Another possible 
explanation could be that women are initially at a corner solution with ܯௌ∗ ൌ 0, and thus 
cannot reduce voluntary involvement at work any further. 
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If intra-household interactions are instead cooperative, spouses would jointly 
maximize a utility function that is increasing in the utility of each spouse. In this case it can be 
shown that positive cross-hour effects for the husband may be driven by both 
complementarity of leisure in his utility function, and complementarity of leisure in his wife’s 
utility function. Thus one could now detect positive cross-effects for a husband not only 
because he may enjoy leisure more at higher wife’s leisure, but also because his wife may 
enjoy leisure more at higher husband leisure, and this mechanism is taken into account by the 
cooperative nature of household decisions. Given this result, it is not straightforward to 
generate positive cross-effects for men but zero cross-effects for women, unless women are 
initially at a corner solution with ܯௌ∗ ൌ 0. 
Assume for simplicity a linear household welfare function of the type  
   ܷܽሺ݈,ܯ,ܪௌ, ܥሻ ൅ ܾܷௌሺ݈ௌ,ܯௌ, ܪ, ܥሻ    (F3) 
where ܽ and ܾ are spouse-specific Pareto weights.5 In the special case with ܯௌ∗ ൌ 0, cross-
effects for husband are given by: 
																																												߲ܪ
∗
߲ܮௌ ൌ
߲ܯ∗
߲ܮௌ ൌ
ܽሺܷଶଷ െ ଵܷଷሻ െ ܾ ଵܷଷௌ
ܽݑଶ െ ܾܷଷଷௌ 	
߲ܯௌ∗
߲ܮௌ ,																													ሺF4ሻ 
where ܽݑଶ െ ܾܷଷଷௌ ൐ 0 due to the concavity of ܷ and ܷௌ. In this context, cross-hour effects 
for men capture leisure complementarities in both their own utility function (ܷଶଷ െ ଵܷଷ ൐ 0) 
and their wife's utility function (െ ଵܷଷ ൐ 0). But such complementarities, if any, would not 
show up in cross-hour effects for women if ܯௌ∗ ൌ 0. 
Note finally that in this framework we have implicitly interpreted all nonmarket time 
as leisure, while in reality it can include both leisure and home production. We believe, 
however, that allowing for home production would not substantially alter the interpretation of 
the estimated cross-hour effect. In this case positive cross-hour effects would imply 
complementarity of spousal nonmarket time, while negative cross-hour effects would imply 
substitutability of nonmarket time, where complementarity would be plausibly driven by the 
leisure component of nonmarket time, while substitutability would be driven by the home 
production component. As we find positive cross-hour effects, we should conclude that 
complementarity of leisure dominates substitutability of home production.  
                                                 
5 Given that the natural experiment that we exploit does not affect spouses’ relative income, we do not need to 
make assumptions on whether ܽ and ܾ are constant (as in the unitary model) or vary with spouses’ relative 
income (as in a typical collective model).  
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Table A1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A Men 
 Full sample  Employed 
 Wife not 
treated Wife treated  
Wife not 
treated Wife treated 
Years of education 12.7 12.4  12.9 12.5
Age 42.6 41.9  41.7 41.0
High-skill occupation (%) 17.7 14.2  19.4 15.4
Private sector (%) 57.1 66.2  64.9 74.6
Spouse’s year of educ. 13.1 12.7  13.2 12.8
Spouse’s age 40.5 39.7  39.7 39.0
Spouse in high-skill occ. (%) 11.1 8.1  11.3 8.3
Spouse in private sector (%) 54.3 90.2  54.4 90.4
No. observations 130,468 59,426  114,705 52,755
Panel B Women 
 Full sample  Employed 
 Husband  not 
treated 
Husband 
treated  
Husband  not 
treated 
Husband 
treated 
Years of education 12.6 12.4  13.0 12.8
Age 39.4 39.5  39.5 39.5
High-skill occupation (%) 7.4 5.7  10.4 7.8
Private sector (%) 42.7 47.5  63.0 69.9
Spouse’s year of educ. 12.5 12.2  12.7 12.4
Spouse’s age 41.5 41.6  41.4 41.5
Spouse in high-skill occ. (%) 18.7 16.7  19.3 16.6
Spouse in private sector (%) 72.4 93.6  70.1 92.9
No. observations 150,371 86,431  101,923 58,766
 
Notes. The full sample includes married or cohabiting respondents, whose spouse is an employee. The employed 
subsample is restricted to those classified as employed according to the ILO definition. The interpretation of 
figures is as follows: The average number of years of education for men whose wife is not treated is 12.7, and 
the average number of years of education for their wives is 13.1. High-skill occupations include managers, 
professionals, engineers or associate occupations (cadres in the French classification of occupations).  
Source: French LFS, 1994-2009, Insee. 
 
  
11 
 
Table C1 
Usual Hours, Actual Hours and Monthly Earnings 
 
 Monthly earnings 
 Men Women 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Usual hours 
(ܪ௨) 
6.63**
(0.35) 
6.65**
(0.34) 
5.38**
(0.22) 
5.39** 
(0.22) 
Actual–usual hours 
ሺܪ െ ܪ௨ሻ 
0.26
(0.18) 
 -0.15
(0.11) 
 
Overtime hours       
ሺܪ െ ܪ௨ሻା 
 2.61**
(0.40) 
 1.62** 
(0.35) 
Undertime hours     
ሺܪ െ ܪ௨ሻି 
 -0.00
(0.19) 
 -0.27* 
(0.11) 
Mean dep. variable 325.91 325.91 228.74 228.74 
No. Observations 97,470 97,470  102,123 102,123 
 
Notes. The sample includes employed persons for which usual hours are defined. All regressions include 
controls as column (4) in Table 3. Standard errors clustered at the treatment*year level are reported in brackets. 
** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. 
 Source: French LFS, 1994 to 2002, Insee.   
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Table D1 
Cross-effects on Hours Worked, by Sector 
 
Panel A Men 
 
Public sector Private sector Private sector “protected contracts” 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
0.22 
(0.28) 
0.23* 
(0.10) 
-0.18* 
(0.08) 
 
-0.60** 
(0.24) 
-0.26* 
(0.12) 
-0.37* 
(0.15) 
 
1.12* 
(0.49) 
-0.49** 
(0.10) 
-0.60** 
(0.11) 
 
-2.14** 
(0.61) 
-1.53** 
(0.17) 
-1.56** 
(0.17) 
Mean dep. variable 34.77 37.86 37.84 
No. observations 33,170 113,834 90,194 
Panel B Women 
 
Public sector Private sector Private sector “protected contracts” 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
-0.30 
(0.20) 
-0.13 
(0.09) 
-0.32** 
(0.09) 
 
0.15 
(0.22) 
-0.03 
(0.11) 
0.17 
(0.15) 
 
0.05 
(0.39) 
1.34** 
(0.12) 
1.03** 
(0.13) 
 
-1.47* 
(0.58) 
-1.65** 
(0.16) 
-1.61** 
(0.21) 
Mean dep. variable 29.24 30.23 30.90 
No. observations 49,321 105,331 75,156 
 
Notes. Estimates refer to the employed subsample. Column 1 refers to employees in the public sector, column 2 
to employees in the private sector, and column 3 to employees in the private sector who hold an open-ended 
contract, with tenure longer than 2 years. Control variables are as in column 4 of Table 3.  Standard errors 
clustered at the treatment*year level are reported in brackets. ** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% 
levels, respectively.  
Source: French LFS, 1994-2009, Insee.   
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Table E1 
Direct and Cross-effects of the Shorter Workweek: 
Additional Controls for Treatment-specific Shocks and Local Shocks 
 
 Men 
 First stage Reduced form 
 Wife’s hours Own hours 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ܣௌ 0.73** 
(0.17) 
1.17**
(0.13) 
0.90**
(0.18) 
-0.28
(0.15) 
-0.07 
(0.09) 
-0.24
(0.15) 
ܣܲ݋ݏݐௌ -1.97** 
(0.16) 
-1.93**
(0.13) 
-2.03**
(0.16) 
-0.37*
(0.18) 
-0.45** 
(0.10) 
-0.38*
(0.18) 
ܣ - - - -0.09
(0.12) 
-0.03 
(0.13) 
-0.03
(0.13) 
ܣܲ݋ݏݐ - - - -1.96**
(0.13) 
-1.98** 
(0.13) 
-1.98**
(0.13) 
ܣௌ * year yes no yes  yes no yes
Regions * year 
dummies 
no yes yes  no yes yes
Mean dep. variable 30.05 30.05 30.05 38.89 38.89 38.89 
No. observations 189,894 189,894 189,894 167,460 167,460 167,460 
 Women 
 First stage Reduced form 
 Husband’s hours Own hours 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ܣௌ -0.80** 
(0.19) 
-0.25**
(0.12) 
-0.74**
(0.19) 
-0.28**
(0.08) 
-0.13* 
(0.06) 
-0.16
(0.10) 
ܣܲ݋ݏݐௌ -1.83** 
(0.20) 
-1.95**
(0.14) 
-1.86**
(0.19) 
0.12
(0.15) 
0.03 
(0.11) 
0.10
(0.18) 
ܣ - - - 1.22**
(0.11) 
1.33** 
(0.10) 
1.33**
(0.10) 
ܣܲ݋ݏݐ - - - -1.88**
(0.15) 
-1.94** 
(0.15) 
-1.94**
(0.15) 
ܣௌ * year yes no yes  yes no yes
Regions * year 
dummies 
no yes yes  no yes yes
Mean dep. variable 37.07 37.07 37.07 30.32 30.32 30.32 
No. observations 236,802 236,802 236,802 160,689 160,689 160,689 
 
Notes. The sample and specifications are the same as in column 2 of Table 2 for first-stage regressions, and as in 
column 4 of Table 3 for reduced-form regressions. Specifications 2, 3, 5 and 6 include interactions for 22 regions 
* 15 years. Standard errors clustered at the treatment*year level are reported in brackets. ** and * denote 
significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. Source: French LFS, 1994-2009, Insee. 
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Table E2 
Falsification Tests on Further Outcomes 
 
Notes. The sample and specifications are the same as in column 4 of Table 3, using alternative dependent 
variables. Standard errors clustered at the treatment*year level are reported in brackets. ** and * denote 
significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 Source: French LFS, 1994-2009, Insee. 
  
 Men 
 Years of 
Schooling Age Private sector Manufacturing 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ܣௌ -0.045**
(0.014) 
-0.071*
(0.029) 
-0.012**
0.002) 
-0.020** 
(0.003) 
ܣܲ݋ݏݐௌ 0.001 
(0024) 
0.009
(0.040) 
0.000
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
ܣ -0.020 
(0.018) 
0.119**
(0.031) 
0.054**
(0.008) 
0.157** 
(0.010) 
ܣܲ݋ݏݐ 0.025 
(0.029) 
-0.059
(0.044) 
0.016
(0.010) 
0.017 
(0.014) 
Mean dep. variable 12.78 41.45 0.680 0.357 
No. observations 167,460 167,460 167,460 167,460 
 Women 
 Years of Schooling Age Private sector Manufacturing 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ܣௌ -0.022 
(0.012) 
-0.044
(0.024) 
-0.018**
(0.002) 
-0.021** 
(0.002) 
ܣܲ݋ݏݐௌ 0.021 
(0.018) 
0.079
(0.039) 
-0.002
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
ܣ 0.003 
(0.022) 
0.061
(0.039) 
0.199**
(0.011) 
0.138** 
(0.009) 
ܣܲ݋ݏݐ -0.013 
(0.026) 
0.061
(0.045) 
(0.002)
(0.014) 
0.012 
(0.014) 
Mean dep. variable 12.91 39.49 0.655 0.145 
No. observations 160,689 160,689 160,689 160,689 
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Table E3 
Number of Observations per Respondent and Proportion of Switchers 
 
Men 
Number of obs. 
per respondent 
Total number  
of respondents 
Total number  
of observations 
Proportion of changes 
in spouses’ firms 
1 26,231 26,231 - 
2 13,916 27,832 11.9% 
3 9,073 27,219 17.9% 
All 49,220 81,282 10.1% 
Women 
Number of obs. 
per respondent 
Total number  
respondents 
Total number  
observations 
Proportion of changes 
in spouses’ firms 
1 31,110 31,110 - 
2 17,292 34,584 14.1% 
3 11,901 35,703 22.6% 
All 60,303 101, 397 12.8% 
 
Notes. The table refers to the employed subsample, 1998-2002. Interpretation of figures is as follows: 13,916 
male respondents are observed at two dates and 11.9% have a spouse whose firm signed an agreement between 
these two dates.   
Source: French LFS, 1998-2002, Insee.  
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Table E4 
Reduced-form Regressions 
Cross-effects of the Shorter Workweek on Employment and Hours: Fixed-effect Estimates 
 
 Men 
 
 
 
Employm. 
 
 
Hours 
 
 
Earnings 
 Type of hours 
  Usual 
hours
ܪ௎
Actual-
usual 
ܪ െ ܪ௎
Overtime 
hours 
ሺܪ െ ܪ௎ሻା 
Undertime
hours 
ሺܪ െ ܪ௎ሻି
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7)
ܣௌ 0.005
(0.006) 
0.45 
(0.47) 
0.005
(0.009) 
 -0.10
(0.15) 
0.48
(0.47) 
0.12 
(0.12) 
-0.36
(0.44) 
ܣܲ݋ݏݐௌ -0.006
(0.004) 
-0.40 
(0.35) 
-0.000
(0.006) 
 0.15
(0.11) 
-0.76*
(0.34) 
0.04 
(0.09) 
0.80*
(0.32) 
ܣ - 0.19 
(0.42) 
-0.005
(0.008) 
 0.61**
(0.14) 
-0.26
(0.42) 
-0.17 
(0.11) 
0.09
(0.39) 
ܣܲ݋ݏݐ - -1.22** 
(0.34) 
-0.009
(0.006) 
 -1.52**
(0.11) 
0.33
(0.34) 
0.19* 
(0.09) 
-0.13
(0.31) 
Mean dep. var. 0.891 36.88 9.033  38.79 -2.64 0.91 3.55 
No. obs. 81,282 63,796 63,796  56,941 56,941 56,941 56,941 
 Women 
 
 
 
Employm. 
 
 
Hours 
 
 
Earnings 
 Type of hours 
  Usual 
hours
ܪ௎ 
Actual-
usual 
ܪ െ ܪ௎ 
Overtime 
hours 
ሺܪ െ ܪ௎ሻା 
Undertime
hours 
ሺܪ െ ܪ௎ሻି 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7)
ܣௌ -0.001
(0.006) 
-0.24 
(0.41) 
-0.002
(0.009) 
 -0.25
(0.16) 
0.11
(0.40) 
-0.01 
(0.09) 
-0.12
(0.38) 
ܣܲ݋ݏݐௌ -0.003
(0.005) 
0.33 
(0.31) 
0.006
(0.007) 
 0.15
(0.13) 
0.04
(0.31) 
-0.07 
(0.07) 
-0.12
(0.29) 
ܣ - 0.28 
(0.45) 
0.013
(0.010) 
 0.89**
(0.18) 
-0.43
(0.44) 
-0.11 
(0.10) 
0.33
(0.42) 
ܣܲ݋ݏݐ - -1.21** 
(0.35) 
-0.010
(0.008) 
 -1.50**
(0.14) 
0.31
(0.34) 
0.04 
(0.08) 
-0.27
(0.32) 
Mean dep. var. 0.686 29.60 8.596  33.05 -3.61 0.62 4.23 
No. obs. 101,397 67,133 67,133  63,236 63,236 63,236 63,236 
 
Notes. Column 1 refers to the full sample, Columns 2 and 3 refer to the employed subsample, and Columns 4-7 
refer to the employed subsample for which usual hours are defined. Controls include individual fixed effects as 
well as the same baseline and additional control variables as in Table 3. Standard errors clustered at the 
treatment*year level are reported in brackets. ** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.  
Source: French LFS, 1998-2002, Insee. 
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Table E5 
Direct and Cross-effects of the Shorter Workweek: 
Alternative Sources of Identification 
 
 Employed men 
 First stage  Reduced form 
 Wife’s hours Wife’s 
earnings 
 Own hours 
 (1) (2)  (3) 
ܣௌ ∗ ሺݐ ൐ 2002ሻ
 
-1.87**
(0.17) 
0.009
(0.009) 
 -0.47** 
(0.14) 
ܣܲ݋ݏݐௌ ∗ ሺݐ ൑ 2002ሻ 
  
-1.85**
(0.12) 
-0.005
(0.011) 
 -0.40** 
(0.10) 
ܣௌ 1.19**
(0.17) 
0.064**
(0.004) 
 0.00 
(0.13) 
ܣௌ ∗ ሺ1998 ൑ ݐ ൑ 2002ሻ  -0.47**
(0.17) 
-0.002
(0.008) 
 -0.26 
(0.17) 
 ܣܲ݋ݏݐ - -  -1.96** 
(0.14) 
 ܣ - -  -0.09 
(0.12) 
Mean dep. variable 30.13 8.668  38.89 
No. observations 167,460 141,623  167,460 
 
Notes.  Columns 1 and 3 refer to the employed subsample, and column 2 refers to the employed 
subsample with nonmissing spouse’s earnings (from 2003 onwards, information on earnings is collected 
on one third of the LFS sample). In columns 1 and 2, control variables are the same as in columns 2 and 
4 of Table 2. In column 3, control variables are the same as in column 4 of Table 3. Standard errors 
clustered at the treatment*year level are reported in brackets. ** and * denote significance at the 1% and 
5% levels, respectively.  
Source: French LFS, 1994-2009, Insee 
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Panel A: Men 
 
Panel B: Women 
 
Figure A1. Pre-policy Distribution of Actual Hours 
 
Notes. The distribution shown covers employees in firms that have not (yet) signed a workweek reduction 
agreement. The observed spikes are in correspondence of 39 hours.  
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Panel A: Men 
 
Panel B: Women 
 
Figure A2. Pre-policy Distribution of Usual Hours  
 
Notes. The distribution shown covers employees in firms that have not (yet) signed a workweek reduction 
agreement. The observed spikes are in correspondence of 39 hours.  
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Panel A: Wives 
 
Panel B: Husbands 
 
Figure B1. Differences in Hours Worked, by Own Treatment. 
 
Notes. The solid line in Panel A represents the difference between the hours series plotted in Figure 2 for treated and 
nontreated wives, respectively. The solid line in Panel B represents the difference between the hours series plotted in Figure 5 
for treated and nontreated husbands, respectively. All differences are normalized to zero in correspondence of time of 
treatment. The dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals.  
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Panel A: Men 
 
Panel B: Women 
 
Figure B2. Differences in Hours Worked, by Spouse’s Treatment. 
 
Notes. The solid line in Panel A represents the difference between the hours series plotted in Figure 4 for husbands of treated 
and nontreated women, respectively. The solid line in Panel B represents the difference between the hours series plotted in 
Figure 7 for wives of treated and nontreated men, respectively. All differences are normalized to zero in correspondence of 
time of treatment. The dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals.  
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Figure B3. Men's Hours Worked, by Wife’s Treatment  
Excluding Men Treated at the Same Date as their Spouses 
 
 
 
  
Figure B4. Men's Hours Worked, by Wife’s Treatment 
Excluding Men Ever Treated 
 
  
36
37
38
39
40
41
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
year - year of treatment
wife is not treated wife is treated
36
37
38
39
40
41
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
year - year of treatment
wife is not treated wife is treated
23 
 
Panel A: Men 
 
Panel B: Women 
 
Figure B5. Differences in Hours Worked, by Spouse’s Treatment  
Controlling for Characteristics. 
Notes. The solid line in Panel A represents the estimated difference in hours for husbands of treated and nontreated women, respectively. 
Estimates are obtained on a reduced-form specification that includes all controls as in column 4 of Table 3, having interacted 	
treatment status with pre- and post-treatment year dummies. The solid line in Panel B represents the corresponding difference in hours for 
wives of treated and nontreated men, respectively. The dashed lines show 95% confidence intervals. 
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